Introduction
The Equality Act 2010 protects 9 distinct characteristics, including gender identity and religion or belief. Recent case law shows that complications arise when two protected characteristics conflict in the workplace, particularly philosophical belief and gender identity. Matters become more complex when human rights, especially freedom of expression, enter the analysis.
This article examines key cases, including Denise Fahmy v Arts Council England (case no. 6000042/2022) and Jo Phoenix v The Open University (case nos. 3322700/2021 and 3323841/2021), to assess whether tribunals are achieving an equitable balance between competing rights.
Gender Critical Beliefs as Protected Beliefs
Following Maya Forstater v CGD Europe (UKEAT/0105/20/JOJ), gender critical beliefs, which emphasise sex as inherent and immutable, qualify as protected philosophical beliefs under s.10 of the Equality Act 2010. As a result, more claimants have succeeded in arguing that their gender critical views attract legal protection.
Denise Fahmy v Arts Council England
In Fahmy, the claimant participated in an internal Teams meeting discussing support for a charity. Some employees objected to the charity on the basis that it was transphobic, leading to hostile comments about gender critical beliefs. Later, an email circulated an “allied support sheet” and a petition to disassociate from the charity.
The tribunal found that Fahmy’s views during the meeting were unwise but did not amount to harassment. This demonstrated balance: defending transgender individuals did not automatically constitute harassment of those with gender critical beliefs.
Although Fahmy’s victimisation claim failed, applying South London Healthcare NHS Trust v Al‑Rubeyi (EAT0269/09), the tribunal upheld one harassment allegation relating to the circulated email. This is significant. The tribunal recognised that holding controversial beliefs does not automatically imply discrimination based on gender identity, nor does it justify harassment.
The tribunal accepted, without challenge, that Fahmy’s gender-critical belief was protected under s.10, as in Forstater v CGD Europe and Others [2022] ICR 1 (EAT). However, this acceptance reinforced ongoing issues with the Grainger criteria (Grainger plc v Nicholson [2010] IRLR 4). The criteria, linked to Art.9, have caused confusion in domestic cases by blurring the distinction between the belief itself and its manifestation.
This confusion is reflected in contradictory EAT statements. In Grey v Mulberry Co (Design) Ltd [2019] ICR 175, the tribunal emphasised manifestation. In Forstater, the focus shifted to the belief itself. Tribunals are urged “not to cheapen the significance of the words” (Grant v HM Land Registry [2011] IRLR 748), yet also cautioned against imposing liability for every unfortunate phrase (Richmond Pharmacology v Dhaliwal [2009] IRLR 336). These inconsistencies hinder coherent interpretation of s.10.
Fahmy also highlighted that courts assess beliefs not for truth, but against legal standards. Patten (2023) argues that this raises concerns about maintaining cogency if tribunals cannot evaluate belief validity. Without cogency, balancing rights becomes difficult and risks setting problematic precedents. Until Parliament defines “philosophical belief” in statute and the Grainger criteria remain in use, inconsistent interpretations of s.10 are likely.
Had the outcome differed, the case could have set a troubling precedent, allowing discrimination based primarily on expressing controversial views.
Jo Phoenix v The Open University
In Phoenix, the claimant was subjected to harassment after expressing gender critical views. The tribunal upheld at least 17 grounds against the Open University, reinforcing that holding and expressing gender-critical beliefs is not harassment unless the statutory test is met.
Unlike Fahmy, Phoenix examined the balance between freedom of expression and protected beliefs. The dispute arose when staff signed a letter calling for the removal of a research network established by Phoenix, claiming it offended trans individuals. The Open University argued that the letter was protected expression. The tribunal disagreed, finding that freedom of expression has limits. The letter amounted to harassment because it aimed to damage Phoenix’s reputation for holding gender critical views.
This ruling emphasised that freedom of expression cannot justify harassment, particularly when directed at individuals for holding contentious beliefs.
The Wider Landscape
Both cases reference Forstater, but commentators note that Forstater is context-specific (Cowan and Morris, 2022). In Mackereth v The Department of Work and Pensions Advanced Personnel Management Group (UK) Limited [2022] EAT 99, the tribunal applied Forstater but highlighted that freedom of speech may yield to equality and diversity interests.
Fahmy and Phoenix depart from this trajectory by emphasising proportionality when adjudicating conflicting rights. Their balanced approach contrasts with Lee v Ashers Baking Ltd [2018] UKSC 49 and Lister v New College Swindon (case no. 1404223/2022). Ashers was widely discussed for affirming freedom of expression, but critics argued that it appeared to prioritise expression over protected characteristics.
Conclusion
Recent case law shows a trend towards favouring freedom of expression. This shift can be viewed as progress towards equality, particularly in a climate shaped by “cancel culture”. Failing to address these issues risks creating a hierarchy of protected characteristics, giving some traits undue supremacy over others. This contradicts Lady Hale’s reminder that “discrimination ought to be an easy concept” (Essop v Home Office and Naeem v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] UKSC 27).
These cases confirm that employment law protects philosophical beliefs. Solicitors advising on discrimination claims must consider these protections when navigating belief-related disputes.
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