Jones v Birmingham City Council: The Supreme Court Confirms the Civil Standard for Gang‑Related Injunctions

Background

The proceedings arose from an interim injunction preventing the appellant, Mr Jones, from entering large parts of central Birmingham and engaging in gang‑related violence. Birmingham City Council applied for injunctions in 2017 against Mr Jones and seventeen others following a West Midlands Police investigation into gang activity. The injunctions were granted under section 34 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 and Part 1 of the Anti‑social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.

Judge Wall in the Birmingham County Court was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Mr Jones had engaged in gang‑related violence and anti‑social behaviour. Mr Jones argued that applying the civil standard of proof was incompatible with Article 6 ECHR and that the criminal standard should apply. After successive appeals, the case reached the Supreme Court, where Lord Lloyd‑Jones delivered the unanimous judgment dismissing the appeal.

Proceedings

Mr Jones first sought to transfer the case to the High Court to obtain a declaration of incompatibility with Article 6 ECHR. He argued that the right to a fair trial required the criminal standard of proof. Burton J rejected this, holding that the proceedings did not relate to a criminal charge and that the civil standard was appropriate.

Judge Wall applied the statutory conditions under the 2009 and 2014 Acts. These required proof that the person engaged in, encouraged or assisted gang‑related violence or drug‑dealing activity under the 2009 Act, and engaged or threatened to engage in anti‑social behaviour under the 2014 Act. Satisfied on the balance of probabilities, the court issued the injunction.

Mr Jones appealed to the Court of Appeal, which upheld the High Court’s decision. The Court of Appeal confirmed that the proceedings were civil and that applying the civil standard was compatible with Article 6. Mr Jones appealed again to the Supreme Court.

Judgment

Since Mr Jones conceded that the proceedings did not relate to a criminal charge, the Supreme Court addressed two issues:

• Whether R (McCann) v Crown Court at Manchester should be followed, requiring the criminal standard for anti‑social behaviour orders.
• Whether Article 6(1) ECHR requires the criminal standard for injunctions under the 2009 and 2014 Acts.

Distinguishing McCann

Lord Lloyd‑Jones declined to follow McCann. In McCann, Lord Steyn adopted the criminal standard for pragmatic reasons, to avoid confusion surrounding the former “heightened civil standard”, which was almost indistinguishable from the criminal standard. Since then, domestic law has clarified that only two standards exist: civil and criminal. The enhanced civil standard no longer exists.

Parliament expressly legislated for the civil standard in the 2009 and 2014 Acts. Lloyd‑Jones emphasised that there was “no room” for courts to impose a criminal standard as a matter of common law fairness. Therefore, McCann does not support Mr Jones’ argument.

Article 6 ECHR

Lloyd‑Jones rejected the argument that Article 6(1) requires the criminal standard. Article 6 guarantees a fair trial in both civil and criminal proceedings. European Court of Human Rights case law confirms that matters such as the admissibility of evidence, the competence of witnesses, and the applicable standard of proof are for national law to determine, provided fairness is maintained.

No authority suggests that Article 6(1) requires the criminal standard for civil injunctions. Article 6 is consistent with courts applying the civil standard when deciding whether conduct satisfies statutory criteria.

The appeal was dismissed.

Commentary

The Supreme Court’s decision confirms that UK law has no heightened civil standard equivalent to the criminal standard. Civil proceedings, including applications for gang‑related and anti‑social behaviour injunctions, require proof only on the balance of probabilities. The seriousness of allegations or consequences does not alter the standard.

However, the civil standard still demands cogent evidence. As Lloyd‑Jones noted, where events are inherently unlikely, stronger evidence is required to tip the balance. Councils applying for civil remedies must therefore present robust evidence, even though the criminal standard does not apply.