Jalla v Shell: The Supreme Court Clarifies Continuing Nuisance in Oil Spill Litigation

Background

Appellants

Harrison Omotsola Jalla and others.

Respondents

Shell International Trading and Shipping Company and Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company.

The Issue

The claimants argued that the presence of oil on their land amounted to a continuing nuisance. If accepted, this would mean the cause of action accrued daily, extending the limitation period. The lower courts rejected this argument. The claimants appealed to the Supreme Court.

Judges

Lord Reed, Lord Briggs, Lord Kitchin, Lord Sales, Lord Burrows.

Lord Burrows delivered the judgment, with all other judges agreeing.

Procedural History

High Court

Stuart‑Smith J held that the spill was not a continuing nuisance. Reported at [2020] EWHC 459 (TCC).

Court of Appeal

Lewison, Newey and Coulson LJJ dismissed the appeal. Coulson LJ delivered the leading judgment. Reported at [2021] EWCA Civ 63.

Supreme Court

The Supreme Court upheld both earlier decisions. The judgment is final.

Proceedings and Key Arguments

Counsel for the claimants relied on Darley to argue that the ongoing presence of oil constituted a continuing cause of action. The Supreme Court rejected this. In Darley, fresh and distinct damage occurred at later dates, creating successive causes of action. The claimants in Jalla did not argue that new and different damage occurred. Their case rested solely on the continued presence of oil.

The Court held that Darley involved separate events of damage, not continuation of the same cause of action. The defendants’ conduct did not repeat over time. Therefore, Darley did not assist the claimants.

The Judgment

The Supreme Court held that the oil spill was not a continuing nuisance. The key reasons were:

• The spill was a single event. The leak occurred on 20 December 2011 and was stopped within six hours. No acts or omissions were repeated.
• Continuing harm does not equal continuing nuisance. Oil on land may cause ongoing damage, but this does not create a new cause of action each day. Treating it as such would undermine limitation law.
• Shell had no control over the oil once it reached the land. Shell had no right of access to remediate the damage. Imposing a continuing obligation to clean up would be unjust.
• The nature of oil does not justify different legal treatment. The Court referred to Cambridge Water to emphasise that difficult‑to‑remove substances do not alter the principles of nuisance.
• The losses claimed were consistent with a one‑off event. The impact on fishing and farming industries aligned with damage caused at the outset, not ongoing interference.

The Court relied on established authorities including Sedleigh‑Denfield, Delaware Mansions, Cambridge Water, Hunter v Canary Wharf and Williams v Network Rail Infrastructure.

The judgment was unanimous.

Commentary

The Supreme Court’s decision clarifies the boundary between continuing nuisance and continuing damage. A continuing nuisance requires repeated acts or omissions. Here, the oil spill was a one‑off event, and the residual presence of oil was a consequence of that event rather than a fresh interference.

The judgment reinforces the principle that damage alone does not create a continuing cause of action. It avoids expanding nuisance law in a way that would destabilise limitation rules and expose defendants to indefinite liability.

The Court applied existing precedent carefully and did not create new doctrine. The reasoning is consistent, measured and doctrinally sound.